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A critical element of word of mouth (WOM) or buzz marketing is to identify seeds, often central actors
with high degree in the social network. Seed identification typically requires data on the full network struc-
ture, which is often unavailable. We therefore examine the impact of WOM seeding strategies motivated
by the friendship paradox to obtain more central nodes without knowing network structure on adoption.
Higher-degree nodes may be less effective as seeds if these nodes communicate less with neighbors or are
less persuasive when they communicate; therefore whether friendship paradox motivated seeding strategies
increase or reduce WOM and adoption remains an empirical question. We develop and estimate a model
of WOM and adoption using data on microfinance adoption across 43 villages in India for which we have
data on social networks. Counterfactuals show that the proposed seeding strategies are about 15-24% more
effective in increasing adoption relative to random seeding . These strategies are also about 5-13% more
effective than the firm’s leader seeding strategy, and are relatively more effective when we have fewer seeds.
Key words : word of mouth, networks, seeding, friendship paradox, product adoption, diffusion
1. Introduction
Firm-initiated and consumer-driven word of mouth (WOM) marketing (often referred to as buzz
marketing), has received a lot of attention, and has proven effective in increasing adoption across a
wide range of products and services. WOM has been examined both theoretically and empirically
using a wide range of modeling approaches to understand both the motivations to engage in it and
its various impacts (Godes and Mayzlin 2009, Iyengar et al. 2011, Campbell et al. 2017, Berger
and Iyengar 2013, Cai et al. 2015).
An important question in WOM marketing is how to choose appropriate seeds. There are a
few broad approaches considered in the literature. The first uses network data on connections
to identify central individuals (e.g. degree or eigenvector centrality) to provide the most WOM
(Tucker 2008, Goldenberg et al. 2009, Libai et al. 2013). Recently, researchers have also tried to
combine multiple networks among the same individuals to identify seeds with specific relationship
types that might lead to higher adoption (Chen et al. 2017). The second uses characteristics of
individuals to identify how opinion leaders can be used to seed networks (Iyengar et al. 2011).
Opinion leaders are often highly context-specific and may not span multiple categories, e.g. an
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opinion leader in fashion might not be so when it comes to consumer electronics or healthcare
(King and Summers 1970).
Another approach is to identify seeds based on local network properties and community char-
acteristics to achieve higher diffusion (Yoganarasimhan 2012). There might be tradeoffs in terms
of the local structure, where network structures that enable high diversity of content might not
be efficient at accelerating the flow of information (Aral and Van Alstyne 2011). The outcome of
diffusion might typically be context-dependent, and thus an approach that is broadly applicable
and theoretically founded would be helpful.
Broadly, the emphasis in the recent literature has been to improve seed identification using
richer and and more comprehensive network data. However, even with easier access to online social
networks, data on the right or relevant network for a particular purpose is often unavailable. For
example, even if one had access to the Facebook social networks of everyone including physicians,
the relevant physician-to-physician network data for seeding a new drug may be unavailable. Even
within a specific context, there are a number of challenges to gathering accurate network data,
including the time and effort required to obtain this data (Stark 2018). Moreover, the dynamically
evolving nature of connections and relationships requires frequent updating of such data. Social
media data, which are relatively easier to access also face the challenge that activity there maybe
more of a substitute than a complement to offline or other social interactions and may not be
effective in high-involvement applications (Borgatti et al. 2009).
This paper investigates a complementary approach that obviates the need to use detailed network
data by introducing WOM seeding strategies when the relevant network structure information is
unavailable. The strategies leverage the Friendship Paradox to identify more connected individuals
for seeding irrespective of the underlying network structure.
Friendship Paradox and Network Seeding Strategies
Put simply, the friendship paradox can be stated as “On average, your friends have more friends
than you do.” The paradox is based on a mathematical result that holds independent of network
structure, because popular people are always over-represented when averaging over friends (Feld
1991), and its use has been suggested for immunization of networks and sensors on networks (Cohen
et al. 2003, Christakis and Fowler 2010). The basic intuition is simple: Suppose we choose an initial
node at random (so each node has an equal probability of being selected) and then choose one friend
of that node at random. The chosen friend of the initial mode is likely to be more highly connected
than average, because by construction a highly connected node will be in the friend set of more
people, and therefore more likely to be nominated as a friend. Consider two extreme examples for
intuition. First, in a simple hub-spoke network with a central node and several peripheral nodes,
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which are all connected only to the central node. Each node has equal probability of being initially
selected, so we are very likely to get a peripheral node. When asked to nominate a friend, all the
peripheral nodes can only suggest the central node, who is their only friend. Second, if we have
an isolated node without any connections, such a node would never be chosen by anyone on the
network as a friend.
The friendship paradox thus suggests potential strategies for sampling higher degree individuals
(ones with more friends) in any network, without knowing network structure (Kumar et al. 2018).
This sampling approach of choosing a random friend is termed as the “Local Friend” strategy (local
friend of friend) and is informationally light in that it only requires access to a set of randomly
sampled individuals, and the ability to obtain a random friend from them. The other advantage is
that the list of relevant friends from which to sample can be easily adjusted as appropriate for the
particular seeding problem at hand. The friendship paradox proof guarantees that individuals with
higher than average degree are obtained in expectation, allowing for potentially better seeding.
Even though one can sample higher degree individuals using these strategies, their use as seeds
cannot guarantee greater WOM or product adoption, because the extent to which higher degree
individuals communicate with friends in their network about the product is an empirical question.
In a recent study, Kim et al. (2015) found that selecting the highest degree nodes did not result in
higher adoption relative to random seeding. They also found mixed evidence for the effectiveness
of friend nominations across two different categories; the mixed effects could be due to differences
in network structure across the villages in their treatment and control groups.1
The above discussion motivates our research questions below.
(1) Can friendship paradox based seeding strategies improve WOM and adoption relative to
random seeding? Can it improve upon an opinion leader based strategy chosen by the firm?
By how much?
(2) Can hybrid approaches leveraging the friendship paradox along with leadership characteristics
lead to higher adoption?
(3) How does the extent of initial seeding (proportion of the network seeded) impact absolute
and relative performance of the strategies?
To address these questions, we empirically model the WOM and product adoption process over
networks by allowing for a flexible relationship between degree and WOM. Further, in contrast
1 It is challenging to control for network structure experimentally since the number of possible networks
structures grows exponentially in the number of nodes. ForN = 100 nodes, there are 2
N(N−1)
2 ≈ 101490 possible
undirected network structures. There have been recent efforts at evaluating the effectiveness of random and
multi-hop stochastic seeding strategies using nonparametric estimation approaches (Chin et al. 2018), where
the typical assumption is that seed sets are mapped to outcomes in a fixed manner.
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to typical diffusion models, which assume that all WOM arises from adopters, our model incor-
porates WOM from both adopters and non-adopters, which enables us to quantify their relative
contribution to WOM.
Estimating such a WOM diffusion model is challenging because the necessary multi-network
data is typically unavailable. Most diffusion models are estimated based on one product’s time
series of adoption through one market (or social network). Further, the original seeding is typically
unobserved, and even if observed it is often not possible to identify the effect of different seeding
without multiple diffusion paths across similar networks. Finally, the impact of WOM might be
misidentified in the presence of advertising (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001), attributing to WOM
what was actually achieved by advertising.
In this paper, we are able to address each of these challenges through data on one product
(microfinance) adoption across 43 independent and relatively isolated village social networks in
India. The firm’s seeding across the different villages leads to exogenous variation in network
position and characteristics of seeds, which aids in identifying the impact of seeding. Also, there
was no advertising or promotion activity by the firm that would confound WOM effects, which is
known to bias estimates of impact (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001).
Based on the estimates, we simulate counterfactuals on WOM and product adoption across these
villages as a function of alternative WOM seeding strategies. Finally, we compare the effectiveness
of the friendship paradox based Local Friend and hybrid seeding strategies relative to Random
and Opinion Leader based strategies. We find that the friendship paradox based strategies obtain
a significant (24%) improvement over the Random strategy, and even the Leader strategy used by
the firm. The Local Friend strategy used in conjunction with the Leader strategy resulting in a
hybrid provides a marginal improvement over either. Finally, strategies that are informationally
more demanding like Top Degree and Top Diffusion perform better than other strategies, obtaining
close to 44% improvement over the random baseline.
2. Data
We use panel data on the diffusion and adoption of microfinance across households belonging to 43
villages in Southern India in combination with rich network data on the social connections among
the households within each village. The data was collected and described in Banerjee et al. (2013).
The microfinance firm identified opinion leaders based on leader and social criteria in each village
prior to entry and seeded information about the microfinance product among these individuals first.
Tables 1 and 2 provide the summary statistics of village social networks, household characteristics
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and microfinance adoption in the villages. In Table 2, the statistics are for giant component within
each network.2
From Table 1, we see that households have an average of more than 4 individuals. Taken as
averages across villages, 92% of households have electricity, but only 29% of households have
latrines. We note the relatively lower variation in the number of people relative to rooms or beds
across the households.
Table 1 Summary Statistics of Village Networks
Statistic Mean SD Min Max
Degree:
Mean 9.66 1.64 6.82 13.59
Standard Deviation 7.09 1.32 5.18 11.02
Minimum 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
Maximum 39.72 13.01 23.00 90.00
Mean of Leaders 12.94 2.59 8.88 18.82
Household Characteristics:
Number of Households 223.21 56.17 114.00 356.00
People in Household 4.48 0.54 3.34 5.83
Rooms in Household 2.31 0.41 0.75 2.94
Beds in Household 0.88 0.46 0.29 2.27
Proportion of Households with Electricity 0.92 0.11 0.23 0.98
Proportion of Households with Latrines 0.29 0.16 0.02 0.91
Proportion of Households with Leaders (%) 12.55 3.16 7.00 21.00
Note: Unit of analysis is a village network (N=75)
Table 2 Summary Statistics of Adoption (%)
Statistic Mean SD Min Max
All Households 19.38 8.16 8.00 45.00
Leader 24.71 12.64 3.57 53.85
Followers 18.68 8.19 7.30 43.71
Electrified Households 19.01 8.38 7.34 45.12
Non-electrified Households 20.72 13.26 0.00 50.00
Latrine Households 14.69 9.17 0.00 36.36
Non-latrine Households 21.85 9.89 7.03 51.25
Note: Unit of analysis is a village network (N=75)
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the village social networks. There is considerable
variation in the extent of relationships among households. Each village contains on average 212
2 The giant component of a network is the largest connected component of the network, excluding isolated
nodes.
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households. Across villages, the mean degree (connections) of households is around 9, The mean
of the standard deviation of degree for households at the village level is large at around 7.1, with
the minimum and maximum also reflecting wide variation. The mean degree of opinion leaders is
higher than the average and close to the maximum of average degree across villages. We observe
that opinion leaders have a much higher degree than average. Finally, note that the variation in
degree across villages and among households within villages provides the identifying variation to
estimate the diffusion model proposed in Section 3 below.
The primary performance comparison in our study is the adoption of microfinance by households
across the villages. The adoption in the data are detailed in Table 2. We find that 19.2% of house-
holds adopt microfinance, with significant variation across the villages. Opinion leaders are more
likely to adopt than followers, perhaps a feature of the information propagation chosen by the firm,
which targeted these leaders in each village. Adoption is correlated with Household characteristics;
electrified households are less likely to adopt compared to non-electrified, and households with a
latrine are less likely to adopt than those without. Broadly, these results suggest that microfinance
is needed by households at the bottom of the pyramid in emerging markets.
3. Model and Estimation
We use a model of WOM and product adoption across a social network. Using network terminology,
households are nodes and connections between them are edges. Households need to be informed
about the product in order to adopt. Households who are informed communicate with their neigh-
bors probabilistically, even if they have not adopted. We build upon the model of Banerjee et al.
(2013), with key adaptations required to study our research question related to the friendship
paradox. First, we allow the WOM probability from a node to differ by degree, reflecting the idea
that WOM effort may depend on this factor. Second, we allow the WOM probability from a node
to differ for those identified as “leaders” by the firm. Banerjee et al. (2013) allow the probability of
WOM to depend on adoption status but not on the number of connections (degree) or for “lead-
ers”. Our extensions are specifically motivated by the strategies examined here. If we choose their
specification, we will obtain a probability of communication that depends on adoption status but
not on the number of connections (degree). Recall that our approach based on Friendship Paradox
obtains higher degree nodes than average. Thus, we chose a conservative approach, allowing for
the idea that whereas high degree nodes may be better due to their degree, they might also be less
likely to communicate with their friends. If we did not account for that, then we could be biasing
the results in favor of the friendship paradox strategy. Similarly, accounting for differences in WOM
among firm designated “leaders” is critical to assess the effectiveness of leader strategies.
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Baseline Model
Word of Mouth Communication: WOM occurs in the network when a household receives informa-
tion (only) from its informed neighbors. We allow WOM probability ps(D) to depend on adoption
status s and degree D.








Thus, qsmin represents the WOM probability for a node with minimum degree (D=Dmin), whereas
qsmax represents the WOM probability for the highest degree node (D=Dmax) and adoption status
is denoted s. These quantities are based on the minimum and maximum degrees across all networks.
Both parameters depend on the adoption status s∈ {NA,A} of the node, with NA indicating “Not
Adopted” and A indicating “Adopted.” The specification in Banerjee et al. (2013) is a special case
of this model when qmin = qmax = q, such that WOM is independent of degree. Nodes continue
communicating with neighbors in periods after they become informed.
Adoption: When a household becomes aware of the product at time t, the household’s decision
of whether to adopt, y ∈ {0,1}, is modeled as a standard logit choice with observed heterogeneity.
The utility of household i from adoption and non-adoption is:
ui(y= 1) = β0 +βXi + εi,1
ui(y= 0) = εi,0 (2)
Xi represents the vector of leader characteristics of household i, β the vector of coefficients, and
εi,s are distributed as Type I EV random variables.
After a node becomes informed either as an initial seed or through a neighbor, further WOM
from others does not impact the likelihood of adoption. Thus, WOM is purely informational rather
than persuasive in this baseline.While the baseline model provides a useful benchmark, it leads to
the question of whether there are more complex decision processes for communication and adoption,
which we examine next.
Endorsement or Persuasion
In the endorsement or persuasion model, (termed “complex contagion” by Centola and Macy
(2007)), likelihood of adoption varies based on whether WOM is received from more friends. Fol-
lowing Banerjee et al. (2013), the utility of adoption is:
ui(y= 1) = β0 +βXi +λFit + εi,1 (3)
where Fit is the fraction of neighbors who have informed i about microfinance and λ is the endorse-
ment parameter. The utility of non-adoption remains unchanged.
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Leader Effects
Leaders selected as seeds by the firm may have unobserved individual characteristics (leadership)
that lead to higher probability of WOM relative to non-leaders, over and above their higher degree.
Further, firms may have provided specific information to their selected leader seeds, which may
make their WOM more effective.3 To capture such differences, we extend the baseline model to
allow for differential probability of WOM for leaders:










Thus, if leaders are especially effective in spreading WOM, we would find the parameter q` to be
positive, whereas a negative value would indicate leaders are less effective than others.4
Nonlinear Effect of Degree
Finally, we allow WOM likelihood to be nonlinear in degree by allowing a quadratic effect, which
can also capture potential non-monotonicity with respect to degree.













where qQ represents the parameter corresponding to the quadratic term.
We examine a number of different models, summarized in Table 3. Overall, we have 8 specifica-
tions. The first 4 models have no endorsement or persuasion effect (denoted by superscript E = 0).
In ME=01 , the WOM probability does not depend on degree. This model is identical to the model in
Banerjee et al. (2013). In ME=02 , the WOM probability depends on degree as detailed in Section 3.
ME=03 incorporates a differential effect for leaders to the prior model specification. M
E=0
4 allows for
nonlinear relationship between WOM probability and degree with a quadratic function. The next
four models are identical to the first four, but with an endorsement effect (denoted by superscript
E = 1).
















Endorsement × × × × X X X X
Degree-dependent WOM × X X X × X X X
Leader Differential WOM × × X X × × X X
Nonlinear Effect: WOM and Degree × × × X × × × X
3 Our model does not distinguish between incidence of WOM and its effectiveness, but so long as both those effects
do not change in the counterfactual, the strategy comparisons remain valid.
4 We note that since all initial seeds are “leaders,” it aids the leader fixed effect identification as any impact of leader
fixed effect will be stronger in the initial periods and can be therefore identified off the adoption trajectory. More
details about the identification of the Leader Fixed Effect is detailed in §EC.2.
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Estimation
The model estimation proceeds in three steps similar to Banerjee et al. (2013), with specific differ-
ences. Our estimation is detailed in Supplement §EC.3. Note that we use optimization algorithms
for estimation rather than grid search. Here we provide a high level description of the three steps.
Step 1: Adoption Process – We estimate the adoption process parameters β with a logistic
regression using the adoption decisions of only the initially seeded individuals based on equation
(2).







well as endorsement (λ), leader effect (q`) and quadratic effect (qQ) using the method of simulated
moments (MSM). We use the same set of cross sectional moments used in Banerjee et al. (2013),
supplemented by time series moments, all listed in Table 4. Overall, the moments capture key
aspects of diffusion within a network, both globally over the entire network and locally across
connections. The first moment is global, matching overall adoption levels in the network. Moments
2-4 are local moments that fit household level adoption as a function of adoption characteristics
of their neighbors, and help identify communication probabilities for non-adopters and adopters
respectively. Moments 5 and 6 are also local moments in that they capture covariance in adoption
between a household and its first and second degree neighbors respectively.5 Next, we include time
series moments that have not been used in Banerjee et al. (2013). Moments 7-9 characterize the
temporal trajectory of adoption within villages, which helps us in the identification of the leader
fixed effect, as detailed in §EC.2. We detail how each moment informs the estimation of each
parameter, i.e. the sensitivity of parameter estimates to each of the cross sectional and time series
moments based on the approach of Andrews et al. (2017) in §EC.5.7.




















where mS(θ) represents the vector of model simulated moments, mD denotes the vector of data
moments. W is the weighing matrix, which can either be estimated with a two–stage approach or




Step 3: Standard Errors – We estimate the standard errors using a block-bootstrap resampling
procedure of sampling with replacement, treating each network as a block.
5 We provide precise specification of the moments and the rationale for using them in §EC.3.
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Table 4 List of Moments
1. Proportion of seeds adopting
2. Proportion of households with no adopting neighbors who have adopted
3. Proportion of neighbors of adopting seeds who have adopted
4. Proportion of neighbors of non-adopting seeds who have adopted
5. Covariance between a household’s adoption and average adoption of its first degree neighbors
6. Covariance between a household’s adoption and average adoption of its second degree neighbors
7,8,9 Cumulative adoption upto time t= 1,2,3 (Time series moments)
4. Results
We first detail the results from the adoption model in Table 5. We find that the number of beds
in the household and the rooms per person are negatively associated with adoption probability,
whereas access to latrine in the home and beds per person has a positive impact. The estimates are
not only consistent with the idea that microfinance is typically used by relatively poor households
without access to traditional banking services, but that the poorest households are not the biggest
adopters.6







Rooms per person −1.023∗∗∗ (0.392)
Beds per person 1.147∗ (0.656)
Log Likelihood −603.093
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 6 reports the estimates for the 8 WOM models. We use the SMM (or GMM) J-statistic
(a measure of fit) for model selection, which is a standard measure of model fit for GMM models
and is asymptotically distributed as χ2 under the null (Hansen 1982). Based on the Sargan’s J-test
using the J-statistic, we cannot reject the null that the model is valid. Given that the J-statistic
is lowest for Models ME=02 (without endorsement) and M
E=1
2 (with endorsement), we use these as
our primary specifications to interpret parameters and for counterfactual analysis. 7
6 We have examined a variety of adoption models in Section EC.5.5 and the results presented here represent the
model with best fit (lowest AIC).
7 We also consider a large number of other models to test various other specifications of the data generating process.
We mention a few here. First, we allowed for a “broadcast process” to consider the effect of an initial village meeting
by seeds to communicate to all households. Second, we considered the potential for a ”leader certification” effect to
allow for an incremental effect of leader endorsement on adoption. Third, we allowed for opinion leader seeds to be
chosen by an occupation, auch that leader effects are conferred on members of the occupation. None of these model
10
Table 6 Model Estimates
Model Specification: Estimates (Standard Errors)
No Endorsement With Endorsement















Non-adopter lowest degree qNAmin 0.041 0.036 0.061 0.061 0.041 0.041 0.061 0.056
(0.001) (0.004) (0.011) (0.033) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.023)
Non-adopter highest degree qNAmax 0.041 0.036 0.051 0.051 0.041 0.038 0.051 0.038
(0.001) (0.012) (0.0001) (0.016) (0.003) (0.007) (0.068) (0.062)
Adopter lowest degree qAmin 0.341 0.400 0.386 0.366 0.362 0.339 0.396 0.406
(0.012) (0.086) (0.028) (0.003) (0.009) (0.014) (0.047) (0.059)
Adopter highest degree qAmax 0.341 0.348 0.338 0.339 0.362 0.356 0.309 0.326
(0.012) (0.106) (0.034) (0.073) (0.009) (0.029) (0.052) (0.048)
Leader Effect q` – – -0.022 -0.021 – – -0.021 -0.014
(0.012) (0.046) (0.007) (0.01)
Quadratic Effect qQ – – – 0.029 – – – 0.016
(0.053) (0.03)
Endorsement λ – – – – -0.036 -0.007 -0.021 -0.034
– – – – (0.046) (0.076) (0.067) (0.07)
J-Statistic (×10−6) 2.905 2.837 3.268 3.179 3.088 2.967 3.333 3.337
In Models ME=01 and M
E=1





We first interpret the parameter estimates of the preferred model specifications ME=02 and M
E=1
2 .
We begin with the case of no endorsement. First, the WOM probability for adopters is much
higher than that of non-adopters, by an order of magnitude (qAmin  qNAmin). Next, we examine
degree dependence. For non-adopters, the WOM probability does not depend on household degree
(qNAmin ≈ qNAmax), so that low-degree households are as likely as high-degree households to communicate
with each of their network neighbors. For adopters, however, the high-degree households are less
likely to communicate with each of their peers relative to low-degree households (qAmax < q
A
min). Yet,
high-degree households communicate more overall since they have more connections.
From ME=03 and M
E=0
4 , we find no differential effect of leaders; the parameter q` is small, negative
and not statistically significant, implying that leaders neither communicate more nor are more
effective. For the quadratic effect, we do not find qQ to be statistically significant.
Finally, we find no evidence of an endorsement or persuasion effect, estimated through parameter
λ in models ME=11 and M
E=1
4 . Across all four models, the persuasion effect is small in magnitude,
negative in sign and not statistically significant. This is consistent with Banerjee et al. (2013) (their
specification corresponds to ME=11 ). For the other parameters, the estimates are similar to the
models without the endorsement effect. In the supplement §EC.5, we consider a number of other
specifications fit the data better than ME=02 . The counterfactual performance under all of the models are provided
in §EC.4.3). We also discuss additional model fit metrics in §EC.3.1, evaluating both in-sample and out-of-sample fit
for different model specifications.
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additional models of the data generating process.8 In all cases, our baseline model indeed does fit
best relative to other models, so we use that as the primary specification for the counterfactuals.
5. Counterfactuals
We use counterfactuals to evaluate various seeding strategies based on Friend, Leader, Hybrid and
Network Information categories described in Table 7. Within the Friend category, we examine the
impact of the Local Friend strategy, which samples on friends of randomly chosen network nodes
(households) to obtain seeds. In Leader, we examine both the “(Firm’s) Leader” strategy, using
the original leaders that were designated for seeding by the microfinance firm, and “Like Leader,”
which chooses as seeds leader-like nodes who have similar network positions as leaders.
We use three dimensions to measure network position: degree, eigenvector and power centrality
(Bonacich 1987). This helps evaluate whether the impact of seeding is due to the network position or
due to the differential impact by individual characteristics of leaders. Hybrid strategies combine the
features of sampling on friends along with information on opinion leaders. We examine two different
hybrid strategies: choosing a random Friend of Leader household (weak hybrid) or choosing a
random Leader Friend of Leader household (strong hybrid).
We also evaluate two network information benchmarks, Top Degree and Top Diffusion. Unlike the
above strategies, these network strategies require strong knowledge on who is connected to whom
(network structure) or the degree distribution, i.e. the number of connections of each node. If highly
connected nodes are likely to be better in accelerating adoption, the idea is to choose from the set
of highly connected nodes in the Top Degree strategy. Top Diffusion is an approach proposed by
Banerjee et al. (2013) to identify nodes with high centrality for the purpose of information diffusion.
It requires the social network structure (adjacency matrix), but does not require knowledge of the
parameters of the diffusion process. Seeds are randomly chosen from the set of top 15% of nodes
for both top degree and top diffusion strategies. Further details about the strategies, including
informational requirements, are provided in Section EC.4.2.
We use the estimated parameters from ME=02 for the counterfactual simulations below. In the
Supplement, we provide a comparison of the counterfactual results of all the different model spec-
ifications summarized in Table 3. We set seeding level at 1% of the number of households in the
village; therefore number of households seeded varies across villages as a function of village pop-
ulations. We examine the sensitivity of the results to different seeding levels (0.5%, 1%, 5%) in
Section 5.1 below.
8 We consider a benchmark where there are only broadcasts (§EC.5.1), but no communication through networks.
In §EC.5.2, we consider a model where there is an initial broadcast by seeds, to model an initial village meeting
described in Banerjee et al. (2013). We also consider the case where leaders may be present outside the initial seed set
(§EC.5.3), and where leaders may have specific certification ability (§EC.5.4). Specifically, we show in Figure EC.3
that there is reasonable probability that seeds chosen by any of our counterfactual strategies overlap with the seeds
chosen by the firm.
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Table 7 Seeding Strategies and Implementation
Category Strategy Implementation Procedure (for each of m seeds)
Friendship Local Friend Select node at random from list. Obtain one randomly chosen
friend of node as a seed.
Leader (Firm’s) Leader Select node from list of leaders
Like Leader Select leader node ` at random. Select the non-leader node
most similar to ` in terms of network properties.
Hybrid Friend of Leader
(Weak Hybrid)
Select a random leader from list of leaders. Obtain one ran-
domly chosen friend of this leader as a seed.
Leader Friend of Leader
(Strong Hybrid)
Select a random leader from list of leaders. Obtain one ran-
domly chosen friend who is also a leader to be seed.
Network
Information
Top Degree Select a seed node at random from the list of top (Top 15%)
degree (most connected) nodes .
Top Diffusion Select a seed node at random from the list of top (Top 15%)
diffusion nodes (proposed by Banerjee et al. (2013), and defined
in Table EC.5).
We evaluate seeding effectiveness in terms of proportion of informed households and adoption
generated by the seeding strategies as the performance measure. Table 8 reports the aggregate
statistics on the proportion of households informed about the microfinance service and the propor-
tion adopting microfinance. The improvement for Local Friend over Random is about 23.7%, while
the improvement over Random for Leader is about 14.5%. We also find that the Hybrid strategy
Friend of Leader performs the best with a 24.2% improvement over Random, suggesting that the
two broad approaches of leveraging network structure (using friendship paradox) and leadership
or other demographic characteristics (using Leader indicator) can be combined to achieve higher
performance. However, we note that using the Local Friend strategy alone without any information
about the network structure or leader information can generate much of this performance benefit.
Overall, the Local Friend and Hybrid strategies do better than the Leader strategy without data
on network structure, suggesting that they are viable approaches to seeding WOM with unknown
networks.
As we might expect, the network information strategies, which require global knowledge of
the network structure lead to much greater adoption than the above strategies. Interestingly, the
top degree approach performs better than the diffusion centrality based approach, although the
difference is minimal. It’s likely that for these relatively small village networks, the overlap in seed
sets among the top degree and top diffusion strategies is quite high, hence the similarity. In larger
networks, e.g. Twitter we might see larger differences between them. Overall, we observe that the
Local Friend strategy is able to obtain a little more than 50% of the improvement that the network
information strategies obtain above the random strategy baseline. This finding characterizes the
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tradeoff between the amount of information required and the effectiveness of the strategy in driving
adoption. In cases where it is impractical to obtain the relevant network information, the Local
Friend or hybrid strategies could be profitably used as an alternative.
Table 8: Comparison of Strategies (1% seeding)
Strategy
Informed (%) Adopted (%) ∆Informed(%) ∆Adopted(%)
Mean SD Mean SD over Random over Random
Random 47.83 42.30 9.66 28.40 — —
Local Friend 57.19 44.08 11.95 31.59 19.55 23.73
(Firm’s) Leader 53.79 43.60 11.05 30.40 12.44 14.46
Like Leader 53.10 43.32 10.90 30.14 11.00 12.90
Hybrid Strategies:
Friend of Leader 57.36 43.91 11.99 31.55 19.91 24.19
Leader Friend of Leader 54.53 43.40 11.27 30.58 14.00 16.74
Network Information
Strategies:
Top Degree 64.41 43.97 13.98 33.99 34.66 44.77
Top Diffusion 63.79 44.07 13.82 33.79 33.35 43.15
Note: Parameter Estimates from model ME=12 used for counterfactuals.
We report the pairwise comparison between strategies Table 9. The Local Friend strategy is
better than Random and leads to improved adoption in most of the villages. The Local Friend
strategy also outperforms the Leader strategy across most villages (88.37%). The (Firm’s) Leader
strategy does worse than Random in about 12% of of the villages. The weak hybrid Friend of Leader
strategy is also better than random in all villages, but the strong hybrid Leader Friend of Leader
actually performs worse than random in about 5% of the villages. This implies that it matters
how the hybrid strategy is implemented, and whether the condition of leadership is required for not
just the initial node but also for the nominated friend. The results suggest reduced effectiveness of
seeding when we require that the nominated friend also be a leader. Finally, we note that the Like
Leader strategy is the most similar in performance to the Leader strategy, as expected.
5.1. How does Extent of Seeding Impact Performance of Strategies?
The purpose of word-of-mouth marketing is to choose a small number of seeds to help spread
information about a product or service. We summarize in Table 10 how the performance of the
seeding strategies varies with the proportion of nodes seeded, at 0.5%, 1%, and 5% of nodes seeded.
For full results across all model specifications, see Supplement Section EC.4.3.
We define the performance metric as leverage, in terms of how well a proposed seeding strategy
s performs relative to the Random strategy (whose leverage is 1 by definition):
Leverage(s) =
# Households Adopting under Strategy s
# Households Adopting under Random Strategy14
Table 9 Pairwise Comparison of Strategies (1% seeding)
Local Leader
Like Friend of Leader Friend Top Top
Leader Leader of Leader Degree Diffusion
Random 97.67 88.37 86.05 100.00 95.35 100.00 100.00
Local Friend 18.60 18.60 46.51 32.56 100.00 95.35
(Firm’s) Leader 44.19 86.05 53.49 100.00 100.00
Like Leader 90.70 55.81 100.00 100.00
Friend of Leader 16.28 100.00 93.02
Leader Friend of Leader 100.00 97.67
Top Degree 41.86
Top Diffusion
Note: Number in cell indicates % of villages where column strategy achieves higher adoption
than row strategy.
Table 10 Leverage for Counterfactual Strategies
No Endorsement With Endorsement
Strategy Seeding at: 0.50% 1.00% 5.00% 0.50% 1.00% 5.00%
Local Friend 1.26 1.18 1.05 1.28 1.24 1.05
(Firm’s) Leader 1.14 1.08 1.03 1.13 1.15 1.03
Like Leader 1.12 1.10 1.03 1.13 1.13 1.03
Hybrid Strategies:
Friend of Leader 1.26 1.20 1.05 1.27 1.24 1.05
Leader Friend of Leader 1.17 1.13 1.02 1.18 1.17 1.02
Network based Strategies:
Top Degree 1.53 1.40 1.07 1.55 1.45 1.09
Top Diffusion 1.52 1.40 1.07 1.57 1.43 1.07
The following observations are noteworthy. First, the (Firm’s) Leader strategy always outper-
forms the Random strategy and the Local Friend strategy always outperforms the Leader. Thus,
our main results hold across the range of seeding proportions examined. Second, the weak hybrid
strategy dominates all the others, whereas the strong hybrid consistently underperforms the Local
Friend strategy. Third, Like Leader performs very similar to leader, indicating that performance of
the leader strategy is not driven by the differential leader effects, but rather the network position
of leaders. Finally, leverage for all strategies decreases as the number of seeds increases, implying
that their performance differential is greater under highly constrained circumstances, e.g., when
product samples are limited or the seeding requires intensive education or interaction.
6. Conclusion
We estimate a model of network-mediated WOM and product adoption and evaluated the effective-
ness of alternative seeding strategies that leverage the friendship paradox. The proposed friendship
paradox based strategies, which are informationally light and require little knowledge of network
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structure significantly improve WOM seeding and product adoption relative to not just random
seeding, but also relative to the firm’s opinion leader seeding. Specifically, we find a 15-24% improve-
ment with Local Friend seeding in both information spread and adoption compared with Random,
and about 5-13% improvement over the Firm’s Leader seeding (based on membership of selected
occupations). Further, Local Friend seeding is better than Random across multiple villages with
varying network structures, whereas the Leader strategy can be worse than Random in a significant
number of village networks. We note that this result is stochastic and based on expected perfor-
mance. However, it should be clear that seeding strategies that use detailed network information
can improve adoption relative to the Local Friend strategy.
We find that the relative advantage of both Local Friend and hybrid strategies relative to the
Random strategy is inversely related to the proportion of nodes seeded. Thus, when we have few
seeds, these strategies become even more advantageous in expectation. This result is practically
useful in cases where the target population is large, and the seeding is costly in monetary terms,
or challenging in terms of time constraints or other operational limitations.
The question addressed here deserves further investigation across a wide range of application
networks. As discussed in the introduction, Chin et al. (2018) do not find support for the benefits
of seeding using the friendship paradox while like our paper, Kim et al. (2015) find support for it.
We speculate that one reason that Chin et al. (2018) do not find support could be because the
degree range is 1 to 5. In contrast, in our data, node degree ranges from 1 to a maximum of 39;
hence the chance of finding higher degree nodes through the friend strategy is greater. This is also
consistent with the experimental evidence in Kim et al. (2015) about the role of degree variance
in the value of friend based seeding strategies. Another aspect that is worth mentioning is that
our model is a parametric specification, whereas the identification logic of leader fixed effect is
nonparametric. Although we have estimated a wide variety of models to demonstrate robustness,
with any parametric model, we cannot fully rule out all forms of mis-specification.
As we discussed in the introduction, our data across multiple village networks with explicit
knowledge of who were chosen as initial seeds has many advantages for studying the current seeding
problem. Yet, an important limitation is that we do not observe the information transmission and
this is modeled as a latent process driving adoption. Hence the results are potentially impacted
by the specific models of information transmission. We address this issue by estimating many
alternative models of information transmission and demonstrate that our key counterfactual claims
are robust. Similarly, even though the seeding process is observed, the firm always seeded on
“leaders” based on a certain set of occupations. Though we show that leader fixed effects can
be identified even with the currently available data, it would be useful to examine the value of
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additional variation provided by explicitly randomizing with leader seeds in some villages and non-
leaders in others. It would also be useful in future work to replicate our results in data settings
where the incidence of information transmission and even its content is observable, and alternative
seeding processes are used in the data. If information transmission can be observed, it will lead to
richer insights about how information diffuses through the network under various seeding strategies
and ultimately impacts adoption.
There are important issues that we leave to future research. First, it would be useful to explore
the potential tradeoff in terms of cost and time in using our informationally light seeding strategies
versus investing in identifying (even limited) network information prior to seeding. Second, rather
than use opinion leaders, it may be useful to seed individuals nominated by others as “gossipers” to
assess their impact on diffusion and higher overall adoption (Stephen and Lehmann 2016, Banerjee
et al. 2014). Finally, it would be useful to consider whether seeding approaches proposed here
need to be adapted for highly asymmetric networks, where directional ties become significant
(Ben Sliman and Kohli 2018).
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In Table EC.1 below, we define the terms used in networks. These terms are helpful when we define
network properties and in the moment conditions.
Table EC.1 Table of Notation
Characteristic Description Definition
Nodes Degree Number of connections (edges) of i Di
Edge Connection between nodes i and j eij ∈ {0,1}
Adjacency (Edge)
Matrix
Connection between nodes i and j E,Ei,j ∈ {0,1}
Node Set Set of all N nodes in Network V = {1,2, . . . ,N}
Edge Set Set of all edges in Network E = {(i, j) : eij = 1}
Network Edge Count Number of undirected connections e=
∑
i∈V,j>i eij
Seeds Set of all nodes chosen as seeds S
Adopters Set of all nodes which have adopted A
Reachable Set Nodes with adoption status s∈ {A,NA} reach-




Fraction of adopting nodes among those reach-
able from node i in k steps
zi(k) =
|EAi (k)|
|EAi (k)|+ |ENAi (k)|
Vector of above Vector of adopting proportion of neighbors for
each node
z(k) = [z1(k), . . . , zN(k)]
Minimum Distance Distance of Shortest Path between i and j δij = mink s.t.E
k
(i,j) > 0
EC.2. Identification of Leader Fixed Effect
We demonstrate below that the WOM communication probability for leaders qL is separately
identified from the word of mouth communication probability q for non-leaders. While the argument
itself is non-parametric and does not rely on a specific functional form, our demonstration model
uses a simple parametric representation consistent with the paper. For this argument, we choose
to add a leader fixed effect to the simplest model (Model 1) from the paper.
Suppose we had only static adoption data, we would not be able to identify the fixed effect.
However, (i) the availability of time series aggregate adoption data and (ii) the presence of multiple
networks allows us to identify the fixed “leader” effect.
First, we note that using only the final adoption levels will not allow leader fixed effect qL to
be identified separately from just overall propensity to communicate q. Increases in each of these
parameters will result in higher final adoption levels in a network. It is straightforward to see that
a relatively low level of q in conjunction with a high level of qL might result in the same adoption
level as a high level of q and a low level of qL.
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However, the curvature of the adoption trajectory over time provides variation that permits
identification of the leader effect qL separately from q. Intuitively, if qL is higher, the adoption
trajectory shows a steeper increase in the earlier periods, since only leaders are communicating
initially, and only in subsequent periods do non-leaders communicate. Thus, the proportion of
communication attributable to leaders is highest at the beginning and decreasing over time. Thus,
the impact of a higher qL will be greatest in earlier periods as opposed to later periods. In contrast,
the impact of a higher q will be lower in the initial periods, since few non-leaders are informed,
and it has proportionally greater impact on adoption in later periods.
While the above argument is non-parametric and does not rely on specific functional forms for
identification, for the purpose of illustration, we use a parametric model below.
Simplified Model
We provide a highly simplified version of the model similar to Model 1 in the paper, for the
specific purpose of examining identification and making the required variation transparent. The
main features of this model are:
1. A few leader nodes are informed initially (similar to the main model).
2. In each period, each informed node communicates with probability (that depends on the
node’s leadership status). Thus, non-leaders communicate with probability q and leaders com-
municate with probability qL with each of its neighbors. Note that in this simplified model,
adoption status does not impact communication probability.9
3. When nodes are newly informed, they have the ability to adopt a product with probability
γ = 0.2. (We don’t have any covariates impacting adoption here, unlike in the main model,
and do not require the variation obtainable from these covariates).
The WOM communication probability for node i is specified as:
pi =
{
q, if i is not a leader
qL = q+ q`, if i is a leader
where q` is the leader fixed effect. Recall that the leader fixed effect is the difference between the
WOM communication probabilities of leaders and non-leaders.
We demonstrate in Figure EC.1 precisely the variation that is required for this identification.
There are several sources of possible variation in the network data. First, we observe that both
adoption trajectories for (a) q= 0.01, q` = 0.08, qL = q+ q` = 0.09 (red curve) and (b) q= 0.13, q` =
−0.12, qL = q + q` = 0.01 (green curve) end up after T = 5 periods at the same overall adoption
9 Even though this additional variation based on adoption status might prove useful as a separate source of identifi-
cation, our identification argument does not require it.
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Figure EC.1 Identification and Adoption Time Trajectory
level, i.e. 0.165 or 16.5%. Thus, just having the final adoption levels, it would not be possible to
separately identify q and qL.
However, their adoptions differ in their time trajectories. For (a) (red curve), with a higher leader
fixed effect qL = 0.09, we see the early period trajectory is steeper than the case (b) (green
curve). On the other hand, with (b), the later period trajectory is steeper than in (a).
In general, for different combinations of (q, qL) that obtain the same level of final overall adoption,
the area under the adoption trajectory curve will be greater for combinations of (q, qL) with higher
levels of qL and lower levels of q.
Does exclusive seeding by leaders help or hinder identification of leader fixed effect?
There are two reasons why leader seeding (in contrast to random seeding) is helpful to answering
our research question.
First, at first glance, it may appear that our context in which the firm exclusively used leaders by
the for initial seeding makes it more challenging to separately identify the leader fixed effect. But in
fact, our explanation above should clarify that this exclusive use of leaders for initial seeding aids
identification of the leader fixed effect and allows us to disentangle qL and q. This is because the
exclusive use of leaders for initial seeding guarantees that a higher leader fixed effect will increase
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the earlier adoption trajectory relative to later. Therefore if the seeding had been random, it would
not be feasible to separately identify the effects as one cannot use this identification argument.
Second, leader seeding avoids a specific kind of bias in leader effects. Suppose we only have
random seeding, but there are leaders present in the data. If leaders have different (higher or lower)
degree on average than others, and if they have differential communication, it would not be possible
to identify any leader specific communication effect. For instance, if Leaders have higher degree,
the Local friend strategy could result in more leaders on average. The counterfactual results would
then be biased to find lower effects for the Local strategy than would be obtained in reality. Due
to leader seeding in our data, we can identify and characterize the leader fixed effect (separately
from non-leaders), and thus avoid this potential bias.
EC.3. Model Details and Estimation
First, we detail the estimation of the adoption process, followed by the WOM communication
process, and finally detail the block bootstrap to obtain standard errors. We simulated Nsim = 150
diffusion paths with seeds chosen stochastically corresponding to each seeding level and using each
of the seeding strategies. The reported WOM communication parameters are based on the average
of the simulated diffusion paths.
Adoption Process
The adoption parameter vector is β = (β0, . . . , β6). The logistic regression specification for the
adoption decision follows from the utility specification. The log likelihood for household i is li(β|Xi)

















The adoption process is estimated by maximum likelihood estimation.
WOM Process
Given adoption parameters β, the WOM process is simulated separately for each village network.
We track two states for each household: its information state and its adoption state. The infor-
mation states are uninformed (U) and informed (I), whereas the adoption states are Not-adopted
(NA) and Adopted (A). Both the Informed and Adopted states are absorbing states, during which
nodes can communicate with their neighbors.
An informed household with adoption status s ∈ {NA,A} (i.e. non-adopting or adopting) will
communicate with any of its neighbors in a single time period with probability ps(D). This is a
dynamically evolving process over time, and depends on the informed status of all households in
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the network. We have formalized these details further below using additional notation. Let ps(D)
be the probability that an informed household with adoption status at the beginning of time t
sj(t)∈ {U,NA,A} (i.e. uninformed, non-adopting or adopting) of degree D will communicate with
any of its neighbors in a single time period. Uninformed households do not communicate. During
time period t, an uninformed household i becomes informed if it receives a communication from
any of its network neighbors Ni. This event happens with probability pit = 1−Πj∈Ni(1−psj(t)(Dj)).
The WOM process for each of the Nsim simulations begins with Step (0) and then proceeds
through Steps (1)-(3) for each time period.
(0) Each household (node) in the network is initially in an uninformed (U) information state. In
initial period t= 0, the seed nodes are chosen in each network based on the seeding strategy.
In the actual data, the seed nodes in each village were chosen based on the opinion leadership
criterion. In the counterfactual scenarios, seed nodes are chosen based on an alternative strategy
(Random, Local Friend etc.). In all cases, the information state of the seed nodes changes from
Uninformed (U) −→ Informed (I).
The following process (1) – (3) process then takes place in each period t∈ {1,2, . . . , Tv} for village
v.10
(1) Each household that has become informed decides whether to adopt.
(2) Then, an informed household can probabilistically communicate about the microfinance prod-
uct with each of its network neighbors. The probability of such communication ps(D) may
depend on both its degree D, i.e. the number of neighbors the informed household has, as well as
the adoption status s∈ {A,NA} of the informed household. We separate out the probabilities
pNA(D) and pA(D) as detailed in §3 of the paper.
(3) When this communication takes place, each neighbor receiving information changes its infor-
mation state from Uninformed (U) −→ Informed (I). If the neighbor node has already been
informed earlier, there is no change in its state.
For each simulation and for each village v, we compute 6 cross-sectional moments according to
Table EC.2 at the end of Tv periods of simulation, and 3 time series moments. Thus, for the 43
villages with microfinance adoption, we have Nmoments = 9×43 = 301 moments across the villages.
We then minimize the MSM objective function S(θ) detailed in equation (7) from §3 in the [0,1]K
region to obtain the probability parameter estimates presented in Table 6 in §4 of the paper. For
the MSM objective, we start with the initial weight matrix set to the identity matrix to obtain
consistent estimates. Since we obtain standard errors through bootstrap, a consistent estimator is
all that is needed.
10 The number of time periods varies across villages in the data, with a mean of 6.5 and SD of 1.83.
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Standard Errors with Bootstrap Estimation
We obtain standard errors for the communication probability parameters using a bootstrap proce-
dure detailed below. First, we obtain NR = 5,000 draws using a random grid for the communication






1 ) ∈ [0,1]
4
. The parameter is characterized appropriately
based on the model specification.
We proceed through Steps (a) – (c) below for each of the Nsim draws to obtain moments for
each village v.
(a): We choose seeds corresponding to the Leader strategy used in the data.
(b): We compute the simulated WOM Process detailed above for Tv periods for each draw of the
parameter vector θ.
(c): We use the cross-section and time series adoption status data to compute the moments detailed
in Table EC.2 separately for each village.
Compute B = 10,000 bootstrap estimates using the moments obtained from the samples above.
For b= 1,2, . . . ,B do Steps (d) – (f) below.
(d): Resample with replacement from moments from the set of villages showing microfinance activ-
ity.
(e): Compute the objective function with the resampled moments at each of the NR points evalu-
ated above.
(f): Choose the parameter vector with the minimum objective as the estimate β(b) to be used in
the bootstrap.
The distribution of β(b), with b= 1,2, . . . ,B provides the bootstrap estimate distribution for com-
puting standard errors.
Moment Conditions for Estimation
In this section, we describe the rationales for the moments listed in Table EC.2 that we use in our
estimation. The required mathematical notation is defined in §EC.1.
In general, all moments are informative in the estimation of all parameters. However, the con-
nections between some moments and parameters are more intuitive. The time series moments,
and more generally the temporal trajectory are especially important for identification when there
are differential effects for leaders. We describe the moments and the obvious associated links with
parameters below.
First, we detail the cross-sectional moments MC1 to MC6. (MC1) is the proportion of seeds
that have adopted. Since the seeds are guaranteed to be informed outside the WOM process,
this allows us to estimate the parameters impacting adoption probability without relying on the
communication process. In contrast, (MC2) is the proportion of households with no adopting
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Table EC.2 List of Moments.
Symbol Description Definition
MC1 Proportion of seeds adopting
|S ∩A|
|S|
MC2 Proportion of households with no adopting neighbors who
have adopted
∑
i∈A I [Ni ∩A= φ]∑
i∈V I [Ni ∩A= φ]









MC5 Covariance between a household’s adoption and average
adoption of their first degree neighbors
cov (y, z(1))
MC6 Covariance between a household’s adoption and average
adoption of their second degree neighbors
cov (y, z(2))





neighbors who adopt, which allows us to match a non-adopter’s communication likelihood, because
such an adopting household could only have received information from neighbors, all of whom are
non-adopters.
(MC3) is the proportion of neighbors of adopting seeds who have adopted. This moment most
closely connects to the WOM probability of adopters, since the neighbors of seeds have a high
probability of receiving information from the seeds. With (MC4), the proportion of nodes that are
neighbors of non-adopting seeds who adopt. The focus here is primarily on parameters qNA0 and
qNA1 . With low probability, it becomes less likely that neighbors of non-adopting seeds would adopt
(all else being equal).
(MC5) and (MC6) captures the relationship between adoption by a focal household and its first
and second degree neighbors. This is particularly important in networks where there is a significant
region (or sub-network) that is uninformed. In such regions of the network, both a focal node and
its neighbors will have zero adoption, which results in a perfect correlation. Observe that in such
a case, (MC2) and (MC4) are not informative since the moment will have values exactly zero for
such sub-networks. Thus (MC5) and (MC6) can also be viewed as characterizing the limits of the
WOM process.
Overall, we need to have moments that match global network-level measures, e.g. (MC1) that
focuses on overall adoption. It is also critically important to incorporate moments that match local
network structure, allowing these connections to have a strong impact on the adoption process,
which is what distinguishes the network approach from the Bass model.
The time series moments (MTτ) matches the cumulative overall adoption in each time period
τ period within each village. This is the typical data used in estimation of aggregate Bass-like
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diffusion models. These moments helps us to estimate the time-path of the diffusion process. In
each period of the model, based on the network structure and the diffusion of the information
process, we have different number of households which potentially become informed and therefore
have the opportunity to make adoption choices.
We detail the sensitivity of parameter estimates to moments using the methodology of Andrews
et al. (2017) in §EC.5.7.
EC.3.1. Model Fit
Additional Model Fit Metrics We next evaluate the fit of these models below using 3 addi-
tional measures. The metrics used for fit are detailed below:
1. First, we regress the actual adoption rate during each time period in the data (as dependent
variable) against the simulated adoption rate obtained from the model, similar to what Baner-
jee et al. (2013) present in Table 2 of their paper. The intercept terms are found to be not
significant, and the coefficient of interest across all models indicate that the model is able to
capture and characterize the essential dynamics of the process. If the coefficient of simulated
adoption is close to 1, that would indicate a good fit.
2. Next, we examine typical fit measure like RMSE (root mean squared error) and MAPE
(Mean Absolute Percent / Proportion Error). Lower values of these measures indicate better
fit.
We find that the model fit is consistent with the original paper for in-sample fit (see Table 2
of Banerjee et al. (2013)). We then examine out of sample fit by estimating our preferred models
using 85% of the villages, and holding the remaining 15% of the sample as holdout. We find that
the out of sample fit is not significantly worse than in sample fit, indicating the models do not
suffer from an obvious overfitting problem. Banerjee et al. (2013) do not provide out of sample fit
in their paper.
Table EC.3 provides the in-sample and out-of-sample fit for our preferred models. We note that
the coefficients on simulated adoption for both in-sample and out-of-sample are between 0.87 and
0.89. The RMSE and MAPE measures are similar for both of our chosen models, and it is useful to
verify that the out-of-sample fit is not much worse than in-sample fit. If out-of-sample were indeed
much worse, then we should be concerned about the model overfitting the data.
Table EC.4 provides results for all the model specifications. We find that across the specifications,
the intercept term is not significant and that the models seem to be fairly similar in terms of their
fit.
EC.4. Counterfactuals
We detail first the implementation of each of the strategies, and then performance of the strategies
under different models and at different seeding levels.
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Table EC.3 Main Models: In Sample and Out of Sample Model Fit Measures








Intercept 0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Simulated Adoption 0.874 0.89 0.875 0.87
(0.097) (0.098) (0.096) (0.1)
RMSE 0.067 0.067 0.069 0.069
MAPE (×100%) 0.379 0.372 0.395 0.406
















Intercept 0.002 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.003 0.000 -0.004 0.001
(0.021) (0.02) (0.02) (0.021) (0.019) (0.02) (0.02) (0.021)
Simulated Adoption 0.877 0.874 0.901 0.899 0.867 0.89 0.904 0.876
(0.103) (0.097) (0.100) (0.105) (0.096) (0.098) (0.099) (0.104)
RMSE 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.068 0.067 0.067 0.067 0.068
MAPE (×100%) 0.385 0.379 0.375 0.384 0.379 0.372 0.377 0.393
EC.4.1. Seeding Strategy Implementation
Table EC.5 provides specific implementation details for each of the seeding strategies we consider.
EC.4.2. Comparison of Strategies
Figure EC.2, shows the performance of the strategies pairwise, where performance is measured by
the proportion of informed households in each counterfactual strategy evaluation.
Next, we examine the consistency of relative performance of the various seeding strategies across
villages. ?? provides an overall comparison of the 4 strategies with the adoption levels of Leader,
Local Friend and Hybrid strategies plotted against one another. We find that both Local Friend
and Friend of Leader consistently perform better on adoption relative to Random as all villages
fall above the diagonal. In contrast, while Leader is better than Random for most villages, it is
worse for some villages, as shown by the points that fall above the diagonal in the top-left panel.
Moreover, the villages where the Leader strategy performs especially well are smaller (fewer
households). In terms of the hybrid strategies, we find that the weak hybrid Friend of Leader
strategy mostly outperforms Leader, but it does not do better than Local Friend overall. The
strong hybrid Leader Friend of Leader actually performs worse than the Local Friend and weak
hybrid strategy. In many villages, it performs worse than the Leader strategy as well.
EC.4.3. Leverage Under Different Models
We examine how the number of seeds impacts the performance of different seeding strategies in
the counterfactual across the full set of model specifications. We examine seeding at the level of
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Table EC.5 Seeding Strategies and Implementation
Category Strategy Implementation Procedure (for
each of m seeds)
Information Required
Random Random Select node at random from list as
seed.
Randomly sampled subset of
list of individuals (or Com-
plete List)
Friend Local Friend Select node at random from list.
Obtain one randomly chosen friend
of node as a seed.
Randomly sampled subset of
list of individuals + Obtain
random friend
Leader (Firm’s) Leader Select node from list of leaders indi-
cated by firm
List of Leaders (where leader-
ship is specific to domain)
Like Leader Select leader node ` at random.
Select the non-leader node most
similar to ` in terms of network
properties‡.
List of leaders + Entire Social
Network (Adjacency Matrix
E)
Hybrid Friend of Leader
(Weak Hybrid)
Select a random leader from list of
leaders. Obtain one randomly cho-
sen friend of this leader as a seed.





Select a random leader from list of
leaders. Obtain one randomly cho-
sen friend who is also a leader to be
seed.
List of leaders + List of




Top Degree Select a node randomly from list of
top degree nodes (We specify this as
the top 15% most highly connected
nodes.
Degree of each node in the
network.
Top Diffusion Select a node randomly from list of
top diffusion centrality nodes. Diffu-




tEt] · 1 where E is the adja-
cency matrix and 1 is the column
vector of 1s. As suggested in Baner-




λ1 is the greatest eigenvalue of the
adjacency matrix.
Full Adjacency matrix E
(who is connected to whom)
and the number of periods for
diffusion τ .
‡ : Similarity between nodes in network position could be implemented using the following centrality
metrics (among others): degree, eigenvector, Bonancich power centrality
0.5%, 1%, and 5% to understand how the level of seeding affects relative benefits of our friendship
paradox strategies. The results for different seeding levels are detailed in Table EC.6.
A few observations are relevant here:
(a) The (firm’s) leader strategy typically (but not always) outperforms the random node strategy
for any combination of model / (#seeds)
(b) The friendship paradox based Local strategy achieves higher performance (leverage) than the
firm’s leader strategy under all of the model specifications.
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Figure EC.2 Comparison of Strategies across Villages (1% of Households Seeded).
(% Informed Households)
(a) (Firm’s) Leader versus Other Strategies


















































(b) Local versus Other Strategies


















































(c) Friend of Leader versus Other Strategies













































(d) Leader Friend of Leader versus Other Strategies










































Note: Each data point triangle is a village network in all panels. The size of the shape is proportional
to the size of the village (number of households). Darker colors indicate overlap between villages.
(c) The weak hybrid Friend of Leader seeding strategy achieves better performance than Local
strategy in most model specifications. However, the strong hybrid Leader Friend of Leader
strategy seems to consistently underperform the (firm’s) leader strategy.
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Table EC.6 Leverage for Counterfacual Strategies




















Local 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04
(Firm’s) Leader 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.03
Like Leader 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.03 1.02 1.02
Friend of Leader 1.05 1.05 1.03 1.04 1.04 1.05 1.04 1.04 1.03 1.04
Leader Friend of Leader 1.03 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02 1.00 1.01 1.02 1.02
Top Degree 1.08 1.07 1.05 1.06 1.08 1.09 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.06
Top Diffusion 1.07 1.07 1.04 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.04 1.05 1.05 1.06




















Local 1.21 1.18 1.16 1.15 1.22 1.24 1.13 1.20 1.18 1.20
(Firm’s) Leader 1.14 1.08 0.99 1.01 1.12 1.15 0.99 1.02 1.12 1.13
Like Leader 1.13 1.10 1.10 1.09 1.12 1.13 1.07 1.10 1.11 1.11
Friend of Leader 1.21 1.20 1.16 1.17 1.21 1.24 1.15 1.17 1.19 1.21
Leader Friend of Leader 1.16 1.13 1.03 1.03 1.14 1.17 1.01 1.07 1.11 1.12
Top Degree 1.44 1.40 1.32 1.30 1.39 1.45 1.29 1.34 1.32 1.37
Top Diffusion 1.42 1.40 1.31 1.31 1.40 1.43 1.29 1.32 1.30 1.36




















Local 1.25 1.26 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.28 1.22 1.22 1.20 1.25
(Firm’s) Leader 1.18 1.14 0.97 1.00 1.11 1.13 0.97 1.04 1.12 1.16
Like Leader 1.19 1.12 1.08 1.14 1.13 1.13 1.12 1.10 1.12 1.15
Friend of Leader 1.32 1.26 1.21 1.23 1.28 1.27 1.24 1.25 1.21 1.27
Leader Friend of Leader 1.22 1.17 1.03 1.04 1.15 1.18 1.04 1.07 1.13 1.20
Top Degree 1.60 1.53 1.44 1.47 1.53 1.55 1.47 1.48 1.45 1.58
Top Diffusion 1.59 1.52 1.44 1.47 1.54 1.57 1.47 1.48 1.44 1.55
(d) The “Like Leader” strategy performs very similar to Firm’s leader (within 2-3% of the leverage
metric).
(e) Leverage for all counterfactual strategies decreases as the number of seeds increases.
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EC.5. Alternative Models and Robustness Checks
We consider different models of WOM communication and seeding to assess if our key claims are
sensitive to model specification. Here we consider three models of WOM communication. In §??,
as a basic benchmark, we consider a single source—advertising type, non-network model where
information is not transmitted through the social network, but all households receive information
from a central single source (perhaps the firm). Assessing the relative fit of this model with respect
to our preferred network based communication model can clarify the importance of modeling infor-
mation transmission through social networks before even assessing the role of seeding strategies.11
In §EC.5.2, we consider a broadcast model where in the first period seeds conduct a village-wide
meeting in which information about the microfinance program can be broadcast to all those who
attend. This model is motivated by a meeting process that the firm encouraged the seeds to con-
duct and is described in Banerjee et al. (2013). In §EC.5.4, we consider a process where leaders
have a certification impact—their adoption or support may increase persuasion even outside of
their networks. This model goes beyond the WOM effects of leaders in allowing differential impact
based on source of certification. Finally, in §EC.5.3 we also consider a seeding process where not
just the firm chosen seeds are leaders but a random sample from certain select occupations that
are considered as leaders. In this process, leaders are present both among seeds and non-seeds, but
all seeds are randomly chosen members of these occupations.
In the text of the paper, we had used the best fitting model of adoption (Table 5). In §EC.5.5,
we report the alternative models of adoption we considered and their relative fit with respect to
the chosen model. Finally, we report two sensitivity analysis: a k-fold cross-validation for out of
sample fit in §EC.5.6 and parameter sensitivity to the different moments used in the estimation
§EC.5.7.
EC.5.1. Single Source Model
We consider a single source—advertising type, non-network model here as a null benchmark model.
In this model, information is not transmitted through the social network, but all households receive
information from a central single source (perhaps the firm). In each period, the source transmits
information to each household with probability θ—could be thought of as a household seeing an
ad. Informed households then have a chance to adopt. The adoption model is identical to the main
model in the paper. Informed households do not communicate any information to other household
in this single source model.
Observe that this model is parametrized by only one parameter θ. The estimated value θ on an
average set of villages is θ̂ = 0.46. Using this model, we evaluate the in-sample and out of sample
fit (using 15-20% of the villages as a hold out sample). Similar to Banerjee et al. (2013), we regress
the real adoption data on the simulated adoption trajectory derived from the model.
11 We thank a reviewer for suggesting this benchmark
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Table EC.7 Null Single Source Model: Fit Measures
Dependent variable:
In Sample Villages Out of Sample Villages
Adoption Share Adoption Share
Constant 0.060 0.017
(0.064) (0.197)
Simulated Adoption share 0.847 1.143
(0.544) (1.669)
RMSE 0.112 0.076
MAPE (×100%) 0.38 0.30
R2 0.047 0.055
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
There are a few observations:
1. The coefficient of simulated adoption share based on the estimated null model are not statis-
tically significant for either the in sample or out of sample adoption share regressions. Thus,
this model does not have any predictive powerin explaining true adoption.
2. For the in-sample fit, the model performs worse than our main models evaluated in the paper.
The finding above is not surprising, since a null model must lead to a concave cumulative adoption
curve over time (since there are fewer households that have not been informed over time), whereas
a network based model is more consistent with the S-shaped curve for cumulative adoption, similar
to the classic model of Bass (1969).
Overall, the empirical evidence of Table EC.7 does not support the single source non-network
model, since this model does not capture the primary data patterns of adoption across the village
networks.
EC.5.2. Broadcast during Initial Period
Our model proposed that information about microfinance propagates through word of mouth over
the social network. We consider a benchmark (null) model where the information is broadcast to
households initially in period 0 at a meeting, where the attendance at the meeting is probabilistic.
In such a model, information flows directly from a common source to any of the households in the
network (subject to their attendance at the meeting), and the structure of the social network is
not relevant for this initial communication. After this initial broadcast, regular WOM communi-
cation occurs through the social network in subsequent periods. As in our main models, informed
households have the opportunity to make an adoption decision, whereas non-informed households
cannot do so.
We explain why modeling the initial broadcast mechanism would only strengthen our qualitative
conclusions about the relative superiority of local friend seeding. In a model with the broadcast
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mechanism, we should attribute some part of the adoption in early periods to that meeting rather
than organic household-to-household word of mouth. This implies that the word-of-mouth driven
trajectory would be even lower in earlier periods, which further implies that the leader fixed effect
would be more negative. Taking this logic to the counterfactuals where non-leaders are chosen as
seeds, we would therefore see a further increase in relative performance of the local friend seeding
strategy and other non-leader strategies when compared to the leader strategy that generates the
data.
We now demonstrate this argument by estimating the model that allows for such an initial
broadcast and performing the counterfactual. To reiterate, we restate the modeling assumptions.
• In period 0, the leaders invite members of the village to an initial meeting where they explain
the microfinance product. For each household, the probability of attending the initial meeting is
γ. We refer to this as the initial broadcast effect.
• In addition to the above, regular word of mouth communication happens through the social
network, as we have specified in the main model.
• We consider the case when there are separate leader fixed effects, and the case where this
effect is absent.
There are a few points to consider here. First, there is the question of separate identification
of an initial broadcast effect from the leader fixed effect. Here, the separation is possible because
the broadcast is a one-time initial event, whereas the impact of the leader fixed effect continues
beyond the initial period. Thus, if we have 3 or more periods, we can identify both effects. Next, a
higher level of leader fixed effect (q`) will lead to more friends of leaders being informed (relative
to non-friends), and leads to higher adoption among friends of leaders. In contrast a higher value
of initial broadcast effect γ informs households who are not friends of leaders, leading to higher
adoption among that group.
Second, if the probability of attending the initial meeting is very high, γ ≈ 1, then there is little
role for the network in communication. The model is then similar to the single source null model
of §EC.5.1. More generally, the higher the broadcast effect, the less important are the structure of
network connections. Third, in the counterfactual where we choose non-leaders as seeds, we might
expect this initial broadcast to be less likely or absent. When leaders have a unique ability to do
bring about such a broadcast that non-leaders do not possess, then in the counterfactual, we would
set the broadcast parameter γ = 0. Of course, this assumption stacks the deck against any of our
proposed strategies, but we include it to show that our strategies still perform better than the
leader strategy.
Table EC.8 details the parameter estimates from the initial broadcast model. We find that the
results are qualitatively very similar to that of our main model, and quantitatively the relative
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magnitudes and ordering between the parameters are also the same. For instance, non-adopters
communicate less than adopters, and degree is negatively correlated to probability of communi-
cating with a network neighbor. In the model with Leader fixed effects, the leader fixed effect is
negative but not significant. We also find the initial broadcast effect, which represents the proba-
bility that each household attended the initial meeting to be γ = 0.013 or γ = 0.079 depending on
whether the model includes leader fixed effects or not.
Table EC.8 Initial Broadcast Model Estimates
Model Specification: Estimates (Standard Errors)




Non-adopter lowest degree qNAmin 0.103 0.073
(0.062) (0.062)
Non-adopter highest degree qNAmax 0.063 0.071
(0.087) (0.089)
Adopter lowest degree qAmin 0.401 0.392
(0.034) (0.090)
Adopter highest degree qAmax 0.314 0.259
(0.100) (0.129)
Leader Effect q` – -0.001
– (0.080)
Initial Broadcast Effect γ 0.013 0.079
(0.030) (0.030)
SMM Objective
J-Statistic (×10−6) 5.303 5.986
Table EC.9 Leverage with Initial Broadcast Model
No Leader FE With Leader FE
Strategy Seeding at: 0.50% 1.00% 5.00% 0.50% 1.00% 5.00%
Local Friend 1.26 1.14 1.08 1.21 1.10 1.03
(Firm’s) Leader 1.14 1.09 1.04 1.15 1.06 1.02
Like Leader 1.08 1.08 1.04 1.13 1.06 1.02
Hybrid Strategies:
Friend of Leader (Weak) 1.26 1.15 1.07 1.22 1.10 1.04
Leader Friend of Leader (Strong) 1.13 1.08 1.03 1.14 1.07 1.02
Table EC.9 reports how the counterfactual strategies perform relative to random seeding using
the estimates from the Initial broadcast model. The ratio (leverage) of 1 indicates that the strategy
performs just as well as random.
Further, we observe that:
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• Leverage reduces as the seeding proportion increases, similar to the main model.
• At all seeding proportions (0.5%,1%,5%), the results show that incorporating the initial broad-
cast effect does not change the relative performance of the Random, Local and Leader seeding
strategies, and this holds with or without leader fixed effects.
EC.5.3. Leader Based on Occupation
In our main model, we made the assumption that the set of households with leader fixed effects
is the same as the seed set, as all of the seeds were considered leaders in their villages. But as
per Banerjee et al. (2013), the microfinance firm chose its seeds based on whether they were in
certain “leader” occupations (e.g., teachers, shopkeepers, business owners etc). However, not all
households with those occupational characteristics were chosen as seeds.
It may then be reasonable to consider a specification where the seeds are assumed to be randomly
sampled from those working these selected occupations. In this case, the leader fixed effect should
be associated with all members belonging to these occupations, whether they were used as seeds or
not.







(0.074,0.056,0.424,0.344,−0.016). We then run counterfactuals under different seeding strategies
as before.
The counterfactual results presented in Table EC.10 show that the results are quantitatively
similar and qualitatively identical. The results for all the strategies differ from the main results of
Table 10 because the parameter estimates used above are different.
Table EC.10 Leverage for Counterfactual Strategies
Seeding Level 0.5% 1% 5%
Strategy
Leader by Occupation 1.17 1.13 1.03
Local Friend 1.27 1.19 1.05
Friend of Leader 1.27 1.24 1.05
Leader Friend of Leader 1.16 1.15 1.04
Like Leader 1.16 1.11 1.04
Top Degree 1.53 1.40 1.08
Top Diffusion 1.53 1.37 1.07
EC.5.4. Leader Certification Effect
One concern is if the leader seeds chosen by the firm had an additional certification effect beyond
their differential WOM communication that we have already modeled as the leder fixed effect.
The original study seeded information with leaders who were pre-defined. Thus, there might be
a question of whether such an effect may be present in the counterfactual, where seeding is not
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focused on leaders. Such a “leader certification effect” effect posits that households might be more
likely to adopt if they hear through word of mouth that a leader has certified or endorsed the product.
We detail two arguments below to demonstrate that this concern is unlikely to hold in the coun-
terfactual. First, for this concern to be valid, none of the seeds recommended by the counterfactual
strategy should overlap with the “leader characteristics” of seeds chosen in the original study. To
the extent, those choices were made based on certain occupations and other characteristics, this is
unlikely that our seeding strategies did not have overlap with the chosen occupations.
Second, we quantify the overlap in leaders (which are originally chosen by the firm) across the
strategies, and demonstrate that such leaders are chosen even in the counterfactuals, although
more under some strategies than others.






















Figure EC.3 Seeding Overlap (1% seeding)
We detail the degree of overlap with a density plot in Figure EC.3 that details the probability that
any given leader household will be chosen under each of the counterfactual strategies.12 We focus
on seeding at 1%, the results are qualitatively similar at other levels. There are a few noteworthy
observations here. First, we do expect that almost all leader households have a higher probability
12 The main strategies (Random, Local Friend and Leader) are in solid lines, whereas the hybrid strategies are in
dashed lines and the network information strategies are dotted line format.
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of being chosen as seeds under the Leader strategy, since the seeding is limited to leader households
here. Second, as expected, the Random strategy (in gray) has the lowest probabilities of these
leader households being selected. Third, observe that leader households have a non-zero probability
of being chosen under each of the counterfactual strategies, notably the Local Friend strategy.
Finally, each of the other (non-random) counterfactual strategies have a higher probability of leader
households being selected compared to the random strategy. More specifically, observe that the
comparison of interest is the difference between the Leader strategy (in green) and the Local Friend
strategy (in red).
Overall, we believe that above result indicates that our counterfactual outcomes are unlikely to
be biased due to the potential for some unobserved leader certification ability in the chosen seeds.
EC.5.5. Adoption Model
The adoption model in the main paper was chosen based on model fit across models that incor-
porated household data, as well as network characteristics of households derived from the social
network within each village. We detail the results in Table EC.11. The results suggest that the
household characteristics including number of rooms and beds and indicator for electricity are
informative for adoption, and produce a better model fit, as measured by the Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC). The AIC is a well regarded measure of fit that is commonly used since it balances
model complexity with a likelihood based model fit, unlike measures like likelihood and Pseudo R2.
Specifically, as we add more predictors (electricity and latrine) in moving from model (1) to
model (2), the fit as measured by AIC increases. Similarly in adding Rooms and Beds per capita
to obtain model (3), the fit improves. However, we find that the household’s home ownership and
roof type are not significant predictors of microfinance adoption and the models (4) and (5) that

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































EC.5.6. Cross validation check
This section presents a k-fold cross-validation to assess model fit out of sample. We divide the
sample into k= 10 parts and perform the out-of-sample assessment by estimating the model on a
rotating set of k-1 parts and testing out of sample fit on a rotating part.
The results of the k-fold cross validation for our main model specification are presented in
Table EC.12.13 In Table EC.12a, we provide the mean and standard deviation obtained from the k
different parameter estimates. The standard deviation of the parameter estimates is not very high,
indicating that the parameter estimates obtained from each of the folds are quite similar, leading
to more confidence about the model predictions.
Table EC.12b presents the in sample and out of sample metrics of model fit.The R2 for the
in sample and out of sample predictions based on the model are 0.80 and 0.65 respectively. The
corresponding in sample and out of sample correlations are 0.88 and 0.86.
Overall, we find that the R2 and the correlation in trajectories for simulated and true adoption
are not only high but also quite similar in sample and out of sample. These findings indicate that
the model does not suffer from overfitting and lends further credence to the model estimates.





Simulated Adoption 1.38 0.06
(b) Model Fit
In Sample Out of Sample
Mean SD Mean SD
R2 0.80 0.03 0.65 0.18
Correlation 0.88 0.02 0.86 0.09
13 In this exercise, we use the same controls as in Banerjee et al. (2013), i.e. number of households in village, mem-
bership in self-help groups, membership in savings plan, caste / socioeconomic indicator, and proportion of leader
households in village.
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EC.5.7. Parameter Sensitivity to Moments
We have explored a wide variety of alternative model specifications and assumption for both the
adoption and word of mouth communication processes. However, an interested reader might be
interested in testing robustness to an alternative they have in mind that might be quite different.
This issue is explored in detail by Andrews et al. (2017), who provide a unified framework to help
make structural (and other) models more transparent so that readers can easily evaluate sensitivity
to assumptions. They recommend providing a sensitivity matrix (Λ) that allows us to evaluate how
violations of specific moment conditions can change the model parameter estimates.
One might view the approach of Andrews et al. (2017) as complementary to specifying different
models to demonstrate robustness, which we have also done. Their point is that since it is impossible
to test all potential alternative models, providing the sensitivity matrix allows any interested reader
to determine how each of the data moments contribute to parameter estimates. Following Andrews
et al. (2017), we report the sensitivity matrix Λ in Table EC.13.
Similar to the applications presented in Andrews et al. (2017), we scale the values so that the
sensitivity values correspond to a 1% change in each moment condition. These results can be
helpful in evaluating the sensitivity of each parameter on each of the moment conditions used in
estimation.
First, observe that we use simulated method of moments (SMM), which is a (simulated) version
of Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to obtain the parameter estimates. This allows for the
form of the sensitivity matrix
Λ =−(G′WG)−1G′W
where G is the Jacobian corresponding to the moment conditions g(θ) and W is the weighing matrix
used in the GMM estimation. The main result of Andrews et al. (2017) is that the asymptotic bias
of local violations of the moment conditions is then given as
E(θ̃) = ΛE(g)
so that knowing Λ allows us to determine how violations of the moment conditions g translate into
differences in parameter estimates.
The sensitivity matrix corresponding to the baseline model with the leader fixed effect are
detailed in Table EC.13. For each parameter, the table shows the sensitivity of parameter estimates
to violations of the moment conditions. We have 9 moments that are each present across all the
villages in the data, and in the model the moments are generated from the parameter values.
Overall, there are 6 cross sectional moments, and 3 time series moments (period 1, period 2 and
period 3).
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Table EC.13 Plug-in Sensitivity Λ for Model with Leader FE Effect
Cross Sectional Time Series
Moment # → M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
qNAmin 0.009 0.016 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.022 0.011
qAmin 0.003 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.006 0.003
qNAmax 0.008 0.050 0.005 0.001 0.018 0.014 0.000 0.090 0.037
qAmax 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.013 0.004 0.011 0.002 0.003 0.005
q` 0.001 0.006 0.001 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002
To understand the table, consider for example the parameter qNAmax, which represents the word
of mouth communication probability for (high degree) non-adopters. First, observe that the cross-
sectional moment this parameter is most sensitive to is moment 2, which is the proportion of
households with no adopting neighbors who have adopted. Similarly we find that the parameter is
not sensitive at all to moment 7, which is the initial adoption. This is consistent because households
adopting in the first period are unlikely to be hearing about it from non-adopters. In the earliest
period, only the seeds have a chance to adopt, and the seeds are directly informed by the firm, so
word of mouth among non-adopters is unlikely to play a role. In contrast, the adoption in periods 2
and later are relevant to the parameter, especially in contrast to the initial period. If initial period
adoption is low (consider the extreme case of zero adoption in the initial period), then adoption in
later periods must be driven by word of communication, which then informs both parameters qNAmin
and qNAmax.
Similarly, we find that for the leader fixed effect, moment 2 and moment 4 are most important.
The time series moment 7 (adoption in period T=1) does not contribute any information
about the leader fixed effect. This is consistent with our intuition since the leader fixed effect is
communication by the leaders to their friends, and thus, the level of period 1 adoption will not be
informative of how much communication has occurred through the network by leaders. In contrast,
period 2 adoption (moment 8) is important since we would find a greater jump in the early adoption
trajectory when the leader fixed effect is greater.
Overall, this method provides transparency in illustrating what variation in the moments is
driving the parameter estimates of the model.
